WHY THE RE-ARREST OF OUSAINOU BOJANG AND AMIE BOJANG IS LAWFUL, NECESSARY, AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE

Written by a concerned Gambian (Anonymous)

Dear Editors,

I write as a concerned Gambian to express my opinion on the re-arrest of Ousainou Bojang and his sister Amie Bojang following the court decision to acquit and discharge them. The re-arrest of Ousainou Bojang and Amie Bojang must be understood not as a challenge to judicial authority, but as a legally sustainable step grounded in established principles of criminal law, particularly where an acquittal arises from evidential insufficiency, ongoing investigative gaps, and identifiable risks to the administration of justice, including flight.

The High Court, in its judgment, acquitted and discharged the accused on the basis that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This conclusion reflects a fundamental rule of criminal jurisprudence, that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution, and where doubt exists, it must be resolved in favour of the accused.

However, it is essential to draw a clear legal distinction, often misunderstood in public discourse, between acquittal and factual exoneration. An acquittal signifies that the evidential threshold required for conviction was not met at the time of trial. It does not constitute a definitive finding that the alleged acts did not occur, nor does it extinguish the State’s authority to act where lawful grounds arise thereafter.

Indeed, the judgment itself provides a critical analytical foundation for continued lawful engagement. The Court expressly observed that aspects of the investigation lacked “comprehensive corroborative material” and cautioned against investigative conclusions formed without fully exhausting alternative lines of inquiry.  

This observation is not merely incidental, it is doctrinally significant.

It indicates that the failure of the prosecution’s case was not necessarily rooted in the absence of a criminal act, but in the insufficiency and structure of the evidence presented. In such circumstances, the investigative and prosecutorial mandate is not extinguished; rather, it remains active, subject to lawful refinement and continuation.

Further, the Court expressly affirmed the prosecution’s right to appeal within the prescribed statutory period. This is a crucial procedural safeguard within the criminal justice system. It recognises that judicial determinations at first instance are not always final, particularly in complex and high-stakes matters involving serious offences.

In that context, the question of flight risk becomes legally decisive.

Where individuals are linked to cross-border movement, possess or are associated with multiple identity frameworks, or demonstrate the capacity for mobility beyond the jurisdiction, the law recognises a heightened risk that they may abscond. In cases involving grave offences such as the alleged killing of law enforcement officers, this risk is amplified.

Under established principles governing detention and bail, the prevention of absconding and the preservation of the integrity of judicial proceedings are legitimate and sufficient grounds for continued restriction of liberty. The law does not require the State to wait until jurisdiction is defeated before acting.

Accordingly, where there exists a subsisting right of appeal, acknowledged gaps in the evidential matrix, and credible indicators of flight risk, law enforcement authorities remain within their legal competence to take measures necessary to secure the presence of the accused and safeguard the continuity of the justice process.

On the strength of these considerations, it is neither unexpected nor improper that the State re-arrested the two accused persons in the alleged murder case. On the contrary, the State has acted appropriately and within the bounds of the law, in furtherance of its duty to ensure that justice is not undermined by procedural or evidential limitations at an earlier stage.

It must therefore be emphasised that the re-arrest of Ousainou Bojang and Amie Bojang is not punitive in character. It is procedural, preventive, and jurisdiction-preserving.

Equally important is the broader context of the case itself. The charges arose from events involving the alleged killing and attempted killing of police officers in the execution of their lawful duties. Such offences are not ordinary crimes; they strike at the institutional foundation of law enforcement and public order. The State, therefore, bears a heightened obligation to ensure that all lawful avenues are fully pursued.

Public discourse, while essential in a democratic society, must be anchored in an accurate understanding of legal processes. The immediate reaction to an acquittal should not foreclose recognition of the continuing mechanisms available within the justice system, mechanisms designed precisely to address evidential gaps, procedural limitations, and evolving investigative realities.

In law, justice is not a singular event concluded by a verdict. It is a structured process, capable of review, correction, and continuation within defined legal bounds. The actions taken in this matter must therefore be viewed through that lens. Not as a contradiction of the court’s decision, but as a lawful extension of the justice process, ensuring that where questions remain,

the system retains both the authority and the responsibility to pursue answers.